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SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS
Robert A. Katz
Antony Page∗
INTRODUCTION
In recent years lawyers have become increasingly active in the field of
social enterprise and social entrepreneurship, wherein organizations and people
seek novel, revenue-generating solutions to social problems.1 This is nowhere
more evident than in the development of new legal structures for for-profit
social enterprises.2
In this emerging field, “sustainability” is perhaps the most prized quality,
as well as the most versatile construct. The archetypal social entrepreneur is
one who builds a dual-mission business—one with both profit and a
nonpecuniary purpose—that embodies sustainability. A social enterprise3 can
be sustainable in at least two senses. First, it can be financially or operationally
sustainable: it engages in commercial activity that generates enough income to
support a substantial amount of mission-related activity, and ideally does so in
a manner that directly advances or is tied to its mission. Second, it can be
mission sustainable: its legal structures are designed to ensure that it will
vigorously advance its nonpecuniary purpose for as long as necessary and
without unduly subordinating this purpose to the pursuit of profit. A successful
social enterprise will be sustainable in both senses and, as explained below,
one kind of sustainability can reinforce the other.
∗

The authors are professors of law at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
See, e.g., Wolfgang Bielefeld, Social Entrepreneurship and Social Enterprise, in 1 21ST CENTURY
MANAGEMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 22 (Charles Wankel ed., 2008) (discussing growing interest in
topics of social entrepreneurship and social enterprise).
2 See, e.g., MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN ENTREPRENEURS (2011)
(describing special legal considerations lawyers need to know when advising for-profit and nonprofit entities
that engage in socially conscious or progressive activities); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the
Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337 (2009); Robert A. Wexler & David A. Levitt, Using New
Hybrid Legal Forms: Three Case Studies, Four Important Questions, and a Bunch of Analysis, 69 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 63 (2012); Allen R. Bromberger, Social Enterprise: A Lawyer’s Perspective (2008)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.perlmanandperlman.com/publications/articles/2008/
socialenterprise.pdf.
3 Although the term social enterprise can include both nonprofit and for-profit entities, we use it
exclusively to refer to for-profit entities. See Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35
VT. L. REV. 59, 59 (2010).
1
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A social enterprise can also be sustainable in the sense that sustainability is
its mission—it embraces the pursuit of environmental sustainability as a
defining nonpecuniary purpose. Such entities—often called “sustainable
businesses”—espouse the triple goals of “[p]eople and planet and profit.”4
More ambitiously, sustainable businesses embrace the larger sustainable
development agenda, which seeks environmental sustainability and global
social justice, and asserts an inherent connection between the two. A
sustainable business’s commitment to these goals is reflected in its
performance criteria: the celebrated triple bottom line and its three dimensions
of economic, social, and environmental value creation.5
This Essay contributes to debates over new legal structures for social
enterprises and sustainable businesses by analyzing the multiple meanings of
sustainability in these contexts and identifying unexplored conflicts. It
differentiates sustainable business by virtue of the specificity and breadth of its
nonpecuniary purposes: social equity and environmental sustainability. It also
identifies affinities between various new organizational forms and the
archetypal social enterprise and sustainable business. We conclude that these
organizations, although commonly lumped together, are designed to address
problems of vastly different magnitudes.
Part I examines financial, or operational, sustainability in social enterprises.
Whereas the generation of financial and social value is ideally indivisible, in
practice social value is likely to rely upon cross-subsidization. Part II examines
mission sustainability and assesses claims that new legal structures can help
social enterprises maintain their missions in the face of threats to favor profit
maximization. Part III examines the triple bottom line in the context of
sustainable development and corporate sustainability, and evaluates the
suitability of the new organizational forms for triple-bottom-line businesses.
The conclusion reasserts the important distinctions and inherent tensions
between social enterprise as a double-bottom-line business and sustainable
business as a triple-bottom-line business.

4

PETER FISK, PEOPLE, PLANET, PROFIT: HOW TO EMBRACE SUSTAINABILITY FOR INNOVATION AND
BUSINESS GROWTH 8 (2010).
5 See, e.g., JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21ST CENTURY
BUSINESS (1997); ANDREW W. SAVITZ WITH KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: HOW TODAY’S BESTRUN COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS—AND HOW YOU CAN
TOO (2006).
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I. FINANCIAL/OPERATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY
According to the Skoll Foundation, “Sustainability for a social
entrepreneurial organization is the ability to achieve and sustain impact for as
long as the intervention is needed.”6 The Skoll Foundation’s approach actually
entails two distinct kinds of sustainability as is made clear in the criteria for a
Skoll Award, where the “sustainability” criterion requires that organizations
have a “clear, compelling plan for expanding impact and achieving long-term
financial and operational sustainability.”7 Financial or operational
sustainability is achieved when the hybrid organization has financial inputs
that exceed financial outputs.8 Clearly organizations must have financial inputs
that equal or exceed their outputs in order to survive. This first-order financial
imperative is often the most fateful for the budding social enterprise or social
entrepreneur.9 The second kind of sustainability embedded in the Skoll
Foundation’s approach, mission sustainability, is whether, assuming the hybrid
organization is surviving, the mission itself is being adequately pursued (and
6 Skoll Awards: Glossary, SKOLL FOUND., http://www.skollfoundation.org/about/skoll-awards/skollaward-for-social-entrepreneurship-glossary/ (last visited May 11, 2013). Interestingly, the Skoll Foundation’s
mission is to “drive[] large scale change by investing in, connecting and celebrating social entrepreneurs and
the innovators who help them solve the world’s most pressing problems.” Mission, SKOLL FOUND.,
http://www.skollfoundation.org/about/mission/ (last visited May 11, 2013). Its vision, however, “is to live in a
sustainable world of peace and prosperity.” Id.
7 Skoll Awards Overview, SKOLL FOUND., http://www.skollfoundation.org/about/skoll-awards/ (last
visited May 11, 2013).
8 See, e.g., William Foster, Money to Grow On, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2008, at 50, 54
(“The organization has a sustainable funding model. Conventional wisdom says that nonprofits do not have
sustainable funding models—that is, they cannot develop predictable, ongoing financial support that covers
core operating expenses.” (emphasis omitted)); Jim Fruchterman, For Love or Lucre, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REV., Spring 2011, at 42, 42–48 (“Even successful social ventures that reach financial sustainability (break
even on an ongoing basis) may never recoup the initial investment.”); Peter Kim et al., Finding Your Funding
Model, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2011, at 37, 37–41 (discussing nonprofits seeking financial
sustainability); Daniel Stid & Willa Seldon, Five Ways to Navigate the Fiscal Crisis, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REV., Winter 2012, at 37, 37–38 (citing effectiveness as a necessary precondition to financial sustainability);
Jim Schorr, The Holy Grail for Nonprofits, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2011, at 14, 14 (reviewing
JEANNE BELL ET AL., NONPROFIT SUSTAINABILITY: MAKING STRATEGIC DECISIONS FOR FINANCIAL VIABILITY
(2010)) (“The notion of financial sustainability is something of a holy grail in the nonprofit sector these days.
Virtually all nonprofit board members and executives today face financial situations that at best constrain their
ability to grow or at worst threaten their very survival. On each of the six nonprofit boards on which I’ve
served in recent years, the topic of financial sustainability has been an ongoing discussion, albeit one that too
often finds itself on the back burner.”).
9 See, e.g., Christian Seelos & Johanna Mair, Social Entrepreneurship: The Contribution of Individual
Entrepreneurs to Sustainable Development 1 (Anselmo Rubiralta Ctr. for Globalization & Strategy Ctr. for
Bus. in Soc’y, Working Paper No. 553, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=701181 (noting that “[p]erhaps the greatest challenge” for social entrepreneurs is “to secure external
financing, merely to keep their organizations running”).
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preferably expanded). We examine financial or operational sustainability in
this Part, followed by mission sustainability in the next Part.10
To clarify our discussion, and why we have separated these two questions,
we first distinguish between how lawyers and social entrepreneurs use the term
hybrid. For lawyers, hybrid frequently refers to an entity’s organizational form:
it denotes a for-profit organization that is intended to pursue one or more social
or environmental missions in a distinctively robust way.11
A hybrid organization, also known as a “blended enterprise,”12 has two key
features. First, it is a for-profit entity, i.e., it is organized and operated to
distribute earnings to equity-owning shareholders. This distinguishes the
“hybrid” from nonprofit organizations, which have no equity owners and must
use all residual funds to advance their missions. Second, a hybrid organization,
while organized as a for-profit entity, has certain features designed to make it
advance a social or environmental mission more forcefully than a typical or
conventional for-profit business. In this sense, the legal hybrid advances a
social or environmental mission in operation more like a charitable nonprofit
organization. Yet the hybrid can and may continue to (in fact is intended to)
operate like a for-profit entity by distributing profits to owners and investors.
The three new state-supplied forms designed for social enterprises fit this
model. The L3C, benefit corporation, and flexible purpose corporation are forprofit, with additional features that give a privileged place to a nonpecuniary

10 Both of these concerns are distinct from the question of whether the organization’s activities are
sustainable in that they will yield a net social or environmental benefit in the long run. That sense includes
externalities on both inputs and output measures. An organization could generate net earnings but still be
unsustainable in the broader sense as, for example, is thought to be true for resource extraction companies. But
see Thomas M. Fitzpatrick & Karen Spohn, A 25th Anniversary Redux of the Simon and Ehrlich Global
Sustainability Wager, 1 J. INT’L BUS. & CULTURAL STUD. 1, 6 (2009) (replicating Ehrlich and Simon’s wager
for 1990–2005 “demonstrates once again that human ingenuity and market forces respond to scarcity and
higher prices through innovation and substitution”); John Tierney, Betting on the Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 52. The reverse is no doubt also true for some organizations, perhaps primarily
nonprofits. Many organizations that shut down would claim that although their activities were no longer
financially sustainable, in the broader sense they were sustainable because of the net social benefits they
generated, albeit in the form of positive externalities they could not capture.
11 See, e.g., Michael D. Gottesman, Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal Road
Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 346 (2007); see also
Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 619 (2010).
12 See Brakman Reiser, supra note 11, at 619.
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purpose. In this vein, the L3C has been described as “a hybrid of a nonprofit
and for-profit organization,”13 and “the for-profit with a nonprofit soul.”14
For social entrepreneurs, however, the term hybrid typically refers to the
way in which an organization combines commercial activity and social or
environmental engagement, rather than its status as a for-profit, nonprofit, or
something in between. The typical hybrid pursues a social (or environmental)
mission and relies heavily on commercial revenue to sustain its operations.15
Nonprofit organizations that fit this description are sometimes called
“commercial nonprofits.”16 When applied to commercial nonprofits, the term
hybrid organization is synonymous with social enterprise, which has been
described as “simply a relatively new term for what some charities have been
doing for years, namely promoting their social purposes through a sustainable
business model.”17
If a social entrepreneur is especially creative and motivated, she may seek
innovative ways to integrate or create synergies between the entity’s social and
commercial activities. A group of researchers recently reported:
When we talk to entrepreneurs and students about hybrid
organizations, a common theme that emerges is what we call the
“hybrid ideal.” This hypothetical organization is fully integrated—
everything it does produces both social value and commercial
revenue. This vision has at least two powerful features. In the hybrid
ideal, managers do not face a choice between mission and profit,
because these aims are integrated in the same strategy. More
important, the integration of social and commercial value creation
enables a virtuous cycle of profit and reinvestment in the social
18
mission that builds large-scale solutions to social problems.

The value that the hypothetical ideal hybrid generates is “[b]lended” (a
concept developed by Jed Emerson); it includes but is not reducible to

13 Emily Chan, L3C—Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, NONPROFIT L. BLOG (July 22, 2008),
http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/home/2008/07/l3c.html.
14 CMTY. WEALTH VENTURES, INC., THE L3C: LOW-PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RESEARCH
BRIEF 1 (2008), available at http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Conferences/LegislativeandRegulatory01.
pdf.
15 Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2012, at
51.
16 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 840–41 (1980) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
17 STEPHEN LLOYD & ALICE FAURE WALKER, CHARITIES, TRADING AND THE LAW 2 (2d ed. 2009).
18 Battilana et al., supra note 15, at 52 (footnote omitted).
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economic value or social or environmental value.19 The hybrid’s business
operation itself contributes to the social or environmental mission, rather than
simply generating net profits to be reallocated internally.20 Put differently, the
hybrid is expected to “make” its social value rather than “buy” it through
cross-subsidization. The ideal is reflected in the social entrepreneur’s mantra
that the more goods or services the hybrid produces, the more good it does. In
this vision, an entity’s financial or operational sustainability and mission
sustainability are indivisible;21 the business model ensures both, and neither
can be achieved without the other.
The conventional for-profit corporation achieves financial or operational
sustainability as a result of profitable business operations.22 For those pursuing
a single bottom line, this is the only criterion that matters. Traditionally most
charities depended on donations to fund their operations, but the recent trend is
for them to seek out more earned-income opportunities.23 Proponents of forprofit social enterprise24 hope this approach will lead to greater earned income
and subsidies alike.25 To be sure, subsidies here must be understood in a broad
sense: employees working for below-market wages because they share the
organization’s mission and receive a warm glow from its advance; customers
paying above-market prices for the same reason; investors accepting a belowmarket return, and so on. After all, an organization that receives no subsidies
of any kind would be difficult to distinguish from a conventional business.

19

See BLENDED VALUE, www.blendedvalue.org (last visited May 11, 2013).
See, e.g., Battilana et al., supra note 15, at 53 (noting that “[w]hen consumption yields both revenue
and social value, customers and beneficiaries may become indistinguishable” and if they are indistinguishable
“growth of sales and fulfillment of mission are inseparable”).
21 Christine Hurt captured this idea in a blog post. Christine Hurt, CSR v. Social Entrepreneurship,
CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/04/csr-v-social-entrepreneurship.html
(“CSR focuses on companies that make widgets, but who do so in an enlightened way; [s]ocial
entrepreneurship envisions companies that make a completely different kind of widget.” (emphasis omitted)).
22 See Terena Bell, Being the Only B, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2011, at 27, 28 (“After all,
for a for-profit business to be sustainable, it has to make money.”).
23 See Katz & Page, supra note 3, at 60–61 (discussing the evolution of social enterprise); see also
Battilana et al., supra note 15, at 51 (stating that the increase in the number of hybrids results in part “from an
increased interest in creating sustainable financial models in the wake of the 2007–08 financial crisis”).
24 These organizations are also referred to as “‘hybrid social ventures,’ ‘for-profit social businesses,’
‘social purpose business ventures,’ blended value organizations, companies with a conscience, Fourth Sector
organizations, a ‘for profit with a nonprofit soul,’ and for-benefit organizations.” Katz & Page, supra note 3, at
61–62 (footnotes omitted).
25 Ashley Holmes, L3C: A More Flexible Corporate Model for Social Change, GREENBLUE (Feb. 15,
2012), http://www.greenblue.org/2012/02/l3c-a-more-flexible-corporate-model-for-social-change/ (claiming
that the L3C may “help advance more businesses toward [financial] sustainability in the coming years”).
20
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Some new hybrid forms recognize the need for this. L3Cs, for example,
may depend on “tranching,” which is essentially allowing different investors to
face different risk and return profiles.26 Foundations, it is hoped, will
effectively subsidize the L3C by providing high-risk, low-return investment
capital.27 This would allow other investors to receive something closer to the
appropriate market rate of return, and it allows foundations to potentially
leverage their investment.28 The more sympathy the investor holds for the
enterprise, the lower return or greater risk she may be willing to accept on her
investment.29
Other methods are less direct. Some have argued, for example, that
constraints on the compensation of nonprofits’ employees impair nonprofits’
effectiveness.30 Hybrids do not share these legal constraints on compensation.31
Hybrids may facilitate more efficient operations, thereby increasing the
likelihood of profitability. “Commercial business concepts applied to
nonprofits are key to successful development work.”32

26 See, e.g., id. (“Because foundations can invest in L3Cs and are willing to take on more financial risk in
exchange for social returns (especially during the early stages of these ventures), the risk/return profile
becomes much more attractive for traditional market-driven investors.”); Lauren Thomas, L3C: A Finance
Model for Sustainable Development, SUSTAINABILITY SERIES (Jan. 24, 2010, 6:05 PM), http://www.vitanuova.
net/journal/2010/01/l3c-a-finance-model-for-sustainable-development.html (“The L3C model facilitates
‘tranching’ which distributes risks and rewards unevenly over a number of investors, leveraging PRIs to
increase returns for other investors.”).
27 See Thomas, supra note 26.
28 Single hybrid organizational forms are not necessary for this kind of financial leverage. Consider
Sanergy, which is two organizations—one nonprofit and the other for-profit. The two organizations are
symbiotic, with grant funders underwriting the nonprofit and investors the for-profit. See Battilana et al., supra
note 15, at 53.
29 See David Wood, The Case for Mission Investing, PHILANTHROPY J. (June 1, 2011), http://www.
philanthropyjournal.org/resources/fundraisinggiving/case-mission-investing (discussing below-market-rate
mission investments in areas such as small business development).
30 DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL
47–77 (2008).
31 Nonprofits organized under § 501(c)(3) of the federal tax code face constraints regarding the
compensation of executives that are not faced by other organizational forms, such as LLCs and corporations.
See, e.g., Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, Essay, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2019
(2007) (discussing what a nonprofit cannot do).
32 Maria Luna, The Paradigm Project—Sustainable Development and L3C Social Enterprise, ICOSA
(Sept.
22,
2011),
http://www.theicosamagazine.com/the-paradigm-project%E2%80%95-sustainabledevelopment-and-l3c-social-enterprise (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Battilana et al., supra note
15, at 51 (exploring solutions “for those seeking to combine the value-creating potential of for-profits and
nonprofits”).
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People champion the survival of “good” organizations. This is not
necessarily wise.33 For social enterprise, success should not be defined at the
organizational level but at least in part at the societal–global level. What
matters for a social enterprise should not be who performs it (who adds the
social or environmental value) but rather that the mission itself is being
performed (or more precisely that the social or environmental value is being
added).
A social enterprise’s mission may be accomplished effectively by some
other party. Seventh Generation established a market for green cleaning
supplies, but Greenworks, a line of green cleaning supplies developed and
promoted by conventional (profit-seeking) multinational Clorox Company,
was far more successful in the marketplace.34 It was Clorox that was able to
demonstrate the widespread popular appeal of natural cleaners following the
initial success of Seventh Generation. If the environmental good is the
substitution of less toxic for more toxic cleaning chemicals, Seventh
Generation should be pleased at the emulation,35 even if it were to threaten the
company’s own growth or perhaps even survival.
Even the takeover of a social enterprise or socially responsible company by
a traditional corporation may be desirable.36 As an independent business, Ben
& Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. produced some social benefits that were reduced or
extinguished when it was acquired by Unilever.37 However, because Ben &
Jerry’s could grow much faster under Unilever (for example through increased
international growth and an improved distribution system) they were able to
produce more social benefits, such as the increased use of hormone-free milk.38
Recently Ben & Jerry’s became the first wholly owned subsidiary of a publicly

33 We leave out the point that an organization may be “good” but this does not mean it is optimal. Other
organizations might be better, and perhaps are being crowded out by the incumbent. This point has frequently
been made in other contexts, as in Betamax being better than VHS, or the Dvorak keyboard being preferable to
the qwerty keyboard.
34 See Katz & Page, supra note 3, at 99–101.
35 See id. at 99–100 (“If one of Seventh Generation and Simple Green’s goals was to move ‘green
cleaning’ into the mainstream, they succeeded.”).
36 James E. Austin & Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard, Can the Virtuous Mouse and the Wealthy Elephant
Live Happily Ever After?, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall 2008, at 77, 79.
37 See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a
Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 211–12 (2010).
38 Id. at 245–46.
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traded company to join the B Lab movement and become a Certified B Corp.39
Some have concluded that the concerns about the company losing its social
mission were misplaced.40 Moreover the socially oriented company acquired
by the traditional company may end up changing the acquirer’s culture in
positive ways.41
Likewise for the accomplishment of a nonprofit’s mission, what matters for
society is not who eradicates malaria, but that malaria is eradicated.
Presumably a nonprofit should put the furtherance of its mission ahead of
which organization does it.
For-profit corporations also do not require sustainability for their own sake.
If a corporation’s purpose is to maximize profits, there may well be situations
when closing is the fiscally wise course of action. This is easiest to see in the
context of mergers and acquisitions. Instagram, for example, a company with
no revenue, sold itself to Facebook Inc. for $1 billion, and will no longer exist
as an independently owned organization.42 It is very unlikely that Instagram
would have ever made more money as an independent organization—
particularly because at the time of the purchase it had “yet to develop a model
for generating revenue.”43 Spin-offs and break-ups are another instance of this.
Perhaps more common are companies that should arguably have sold off their
parts, but did not and ended up in bankruptcy, such as Kodak.44
Some commentators believe that corporations will behave in a more prosocial manner if they focus on the long-term good of shareholders or
stakeholders. Yet promoting corporate social responsibility because it is good
business is not really a legal project. Everyone agrees that this is fully
permissible, and in fact should be encouraged. If this low-hanging fruit is
there, it should be harvested. The issue, however, is whether there is lowhanging fruit, i.e., a positive financial return on social and environmental

39 Joe Van Brussell, Ben & Jerry’s Becomes B-Corp Certified, Adds Credibility to Impact Investing
Movement, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 23, 2012, 6:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/ben-andjerrys-b-corp-impact-investing_n_2005315.html.
40 Id.
41 See Austin & Leonard, supra note 36, at 79.
42 See, e.g., Shayndi Raice & Spencer E. Ante, Insta-Rich: $1 Billion for Instagram, WALL ST. J., Apr.
10, 2012, at B1.
43 See id.
44 See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Eastman Kodak Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan.
19, 2012, 1:12 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/eastman-kodak-files-for-bankruptcy/.
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returns, not what should be done with it.45 (Put somewhat differently, if pursuit
of the social or environmental mission is wealth expanding rather than zerosum and thus supported by all, there is no legal conflict.) Such an organization
really can have it all.46 It is, however, an unresolved empirical question how
common this is. If profit-making businesses are actually frequently leaving
profitable opportunities on the table then this is something that business
schools should address, far more than lawmakers.
How can a hybrid organization achieve financial or operational
sustainability? An organization that can capture benefits that would ordinarily
be externalized, or devotes resources to a social mission, likely must take those
resources from somewhere else. There are several potential sources, and all of
them are donors in a sense. Consumers may be willing to pay more, employees
or investors may be willing to accept less, but someone is contributing.47 There
appear to be very few social enterprises that do not depend at least in some
form or another on this kind of cross-subsidy.
Alternatively, and there are few clearly successful models out there,
financial and operational sustainability is achieved through a business model
that by its very nature also advances the social or environmental mission. For
these organizations that do not depend on cross-subsidization, there is little for
new law to do.

45 Academic studies are mixed. See, e.g., ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP:
PROFITING FROM A SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS 22 (2008), available at http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/Corporate_
Citizens.pdf (reporting a survey showing that 74% of respondents believed that corporate citizenship, broadly
equivalent to corporate social responsibility, “can help to improve . . . [profits] at their company”); Marc
Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403 (2003)
(suggesting that corporations practicing social and environmental responsibility will likely generate a financial
return); David P. Baron et al., The Economics and Politics of Corporate Social Performance (Rock Ctr. for
Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 45, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1202390 (finding a positive link between corporate financial and social performance for consumer
industries and a negative link for industrial industries).
46 See Van Brussel, supra note 39 (“The addition of Ben & Jerry’s to the list also confirms the notion that
not only can profit and growth exist side-by-side with social good, but that a positive social agenda can help
create profit and growth.”).
47 In the government context, California Governor Jerry Brown captures this notion with his claim that
some employees should receive less financial remuneration because they are receiving “psychic income.” See,
e.g., Jennifer Medina, In California, Son Gets Chance to Restore Luster to a Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2013, at A1.
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II. SUSTAINABILITY OF THE MISSION
Several legal scholars have expressed concern about mission sustainability
in social enterprises, that is, the likelihood that such an entity (assuming it is
financially and operationally viable) will pursue its mission over time without
being unduly sidetracked by the pursuit of profit.48 New organizational forms
for such entities—also known as hybrid enterprises—are one response to this
concern, according to their proponents.49
There are several potential threats to the maintenance of a social
enterprise’s mission. To simplify somewhat, consider three stakeholders in the
corporate context: controllers (the directors), shareholders (who elect the
directors, hold a financial stake, and can vote in the event of a merger), and
outsiders. In a close corporation, the directors and shareholders may be the
same parties. No issues arise when the directors and shareholders agree on
whether, how, and how vigorously to pursue the nonpecuniary purpose (or if
such pursuit is simultaneously profit maximizing, as in the hybrid organization
ideal). The issues arise when key stakeholders disagree on these matters. The
question then becomes how to enforce the mission when the directors and the
shareholders disagree, or when both groups are ready to abandon the mission
despite public outcry or the opposition of nonshareholding stakeholders. The
sale of Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. is commonly seen as an example of the
first situation, but is more accurately seen as an example of the second, in that
the controlling shareholders of the company acquiesced in the sale both as
shareholders and as directors.50 Finally, if all parties agree, there should be no
impediment to dropping the mission.51 It is also complicated in that an
organization may lose its commitment to the mission either with its existing
controllers, or through the transfer of the organization to new controllers.
48

See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 593 (2011) (arguing that benefit corporation form lacks robust mechanisms to
enforce a firm’s dual mission of profits and social good).
49 For a description of new organizational forms, see Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social
Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1362–72 (2011).
50 See Page & Katz, supra note 37, passim.
51 If reasonable parties agree that a mission should be abandoned, ideally there should be no issue in
abandoning it. Mission sustainability becomes a problem to solve and not a goal to achieve if there is
insufficient flexibility to modify or change the mission. Clearly, in some cases as a normative matter
organizations should no longer pursue a particular mission. If polio has been eradicated, future efforts to
address it are wasted. Cf. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 540–41, 597 (1867) (holding that funds
bequeathed to “create a public sentiment that will put an end to negro slavery in this country” could be used to
benefit “persons of African descent in the city of Boston and its vicinity” after the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment). The cy pres doctrine in trust law attempts to permit this flexibility, but it is by no means perfect.
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Proponents of new organizational forms fear that when an aspiring social
enterprise is organized as a conventional business, it will inexorably tend
toward maximizing profits—and perhaps (over)enriching owners or
controllers—and away from accomplishing its declared nonpecuniary
purpose.52 Some go further, claiming corporate law in fact requires
corporations to be run solely in order to maximize profits, thus precluding a
corporation from pursuing a significant nonpecuniary purpose in the first
place.53 The converse concern, that new forms might emphasize mission to the
undue detriment of shareholders, gets little attention.54 This Part analyzes how
new forms purport to make social enterprises’ missions more sustainable and
why the proffered mechanisms do not significantly improve on existing forms.
The various new hybrid forms that have been created to date attempt to
preserve the mission in different ways. The benefit corporation and L3C both
make it expressly clear that the purpose of the organization goes beyond
making profit.55 (In the case of the L3C, making a profit cannot even be a
significant purpose of the business.)56 Regardless of the legal necessity for new
forms to include these provisions,57 such statements of purpose might
52 See, e.g., Battilana et al., supra note 15, at 52 (noting competitive markets and corporate fiduciary
duties may result in a shift toward a profit orientation).
53 Comedian Al Franken, Senator from Minnesota, famously made this claim in a July 25, 2010 speech.
Senator Al Franken, Speech at Netroots Nation (July 25, 2010) (“It is literally malfeasance for a corporation
not to do everything it legally can to maximize its profits.”). He is not the only one. See, e.g., KENT
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW (2006); Robert Hinkley, How Corporate Law Inhibits Social
Responsibility, COMMON DREAMS, http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0119-04.htm (last visited May 11,
2013).
54 Presumably investors who are most concerned with their return on investment are not particularly
interested in social enterprises. Moreover, most people on the right and left alike would agree that an investor
in a social enterprise invests knowing that the social mission is very important. (Investors in an L3C should
know that the entity cannot have profit as a “significant purpose.” See infra text accompanying note 70.) The
real issue, however, is if there is a shift in emphasis that would violate the investor’s reasonable expectations.
See Page & Katz, supra note 49, at 1381–82. Perhaps there is no reasonable expectation that a social enterprise
will not shift heavily toward the nonpecuniary mission side, but this assumption should be tested.
55 California’s flexible purpose corporation legislation and Washington’s social purpose corporation
legislation, both recently enacted, likewise allow for the creation of entities that expressly have purposes
beyond simply making profits. These two forms can be thought of as “benefit corporations lite,” in that they
relax some of the requirements of benefit corporations and thus more closely resemble conventional
corporations. See Antony Page, New Corporate Forms and Green Business, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 347, 356–72 (2013) (comparing new corporate forms).
56 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(B) (West Supp. 2012).
57 For-profit corporations have included such socially oriented statements in their organizational
documents. The Washington Post, for example, states that its purpose is “[t]o publish . . . an independent
newspaper dedicated to the welfare of the community and the nation, in keeping with the principles of a free
press.” THE WASH. POST CO., RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION 1 (2003), available at
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/62/62487/reports/AsamendedTWPCCertofincNovember.pdf.
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conceivably reduce the possibility of litigation over a business’s pursuit of a
nonpecuniary mission.58 Hopefully, such statements of purpose may better
align the interests of shareholders (who know what they are buying in advance)
and directors (who should manage with a view to achieving the business’s
goals).59 Additionally, requiring the directors to consider other stakeholders in
decision making60 (in a way that some contend existing corporate law does not
permit), will not predetermine the outcome, but does protect almost every
substantive outcome from challenge.61
Most corporations, however, simply include the statutory minimum, which is general language regarding their
purpose being any lawful act or activity. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (2006) (“It shall be
sufficient to state, either alone or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the corporation is to
engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the General Corporate Law
of Delaware . . . .”); APPLE INC., RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION 1 (2009) (“The purpose of this
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation may be organized under the
General Corporation Law of California other than the banking business, the trust company business or the
practice of a profession permitted to be incorporated by the California Corporations Code.”).
58 Traditional corporations can do this too. See Bromberger, supra note 2 (stating that “there is no reason
a business corporation could not include a social mission or values in its corporate charter”).
59 Other for-profit companies have included statements of purpose in their securities filings that suggest
the importance of a social mission. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 68 (Feb. 1,
2012) (“Simply put: we don’t build services to make money; we make money to build better services.”).
60 The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation requires the following:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions and in considering the best interests of the
benefit corporation, the board of directors, committees of the board and individual directors of a
benefit corporation:
(1) shall consider the effects of any action or inaction upon:
(i) the shareholders of the benefit corporation;
(ii) the employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries and its
suppliers;
(iii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general public benefit or specific
public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation;
(iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community in which
offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries or its suppliers are
located;
(v) the local and global environment;
(vi) the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, including
benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and the
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the
benefit corporation; and
(vii) the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit
purpose and any specific public benefit purpose.
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER 12 (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf.
61 Other constituency statutes are very similar, but are generally not viewed as very effective. See
GREENFIELD, supra note 53. As the Economist has noted, “How does one measure [different interests]? What
counts for more: a clean lake or a happy neighbour?” See B Corps: Firms with Benefits, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7,
2012, at 57, 58.
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These two approaches are primarily about preserving a mission that
controllers favor but at least some shareholders do not. So, for example, in the
famous case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the controller Henry Ford apparently
wanted to pursue eleemosynary goals that were resisted by the Dodge brothers,
who wanted a larger dividend.62 More recently, in eBay Domestic Holdings,
Inc. v. Newmark, minority shareholder eBay objected to the defensive actions
taken by the directors that were intended, according to the court, to preserve
“purely philanthropic ends.”63 In both cases, the controllers lost, and it is these
situations—essentially the only two such cases in nearly a century—that new
forms are intended to avert.
Other approaches seem more intended to reduce the risk that directors, or
their successors, will shortchange the mission against shareholders’ wishes.64
The benefit corporation typically includes several additional mechanisms to
reduce the likelihood of this, depending on the jurisdiction. All states that have
introduced the form require an annual benefit report, in which benefit
corporations report on their social and environmental performance with
varying level of details.65 Transparency, proponents hope, is one mechanism to
preserve the mission.66

62

170 N.W. 668, 673, 684 (Mich. 1919).
16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). The eBay decision itself is intriguing. The court left a carve out for
likeminded investors, suggesting that the corporate form might be an appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends if other shareholders did not object. Id. One can easily imagine the formation of
corporations with shareholder agreements in which shareholders waive any rights to object to the pursuit of
purely philanthropic ends. Or one could imagine this if there were adequate investors, because the resulting
entity would look a lot like a nonprofit corporation.
64 Some have argued that an explicit social mission will also help preserve it when a new controller
comes in. See B Corps: Firms with Benefits, supra note 61, at 58 (quoting the founder of Patagonia arguing
“that making a firm’s social mission explicit in its legal structure makes it harder for a new boss or owner to
abandon it”).
65 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630(a)(3) (West 2013) (requiring the disclosure of shareholders
owning 5% or more of the company’s shares); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(1)(4) (West Supp. 2012)
(requiring disclosure of directors’ compensation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a) (West Supp. 2012)
(requiring disclosure of specific actions that could be taken by the benefit corporation to improve its
performance). For a helpful table comparing benefit corporation legislation in different states, see State by
State Analysis, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://www.benefitcorp.net/storage/State_by_State_Analysis.pdf
(last visited May 11, 2013).
66 Disclosure is commonly seen as a means to achieve better corporate behavior, as is evidenced in fields
such as securities regulation. See, e.g., Antony Page, Taking Stock of the First Amendment’s Application to
Securities Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 789, 819–20 (2007). The dispute over the disclosure of conflict
minerals is another example. See Eric Savitz, SEC Approves Detailed Disclosure on ‘Conflict Minerals,’
FORBES (Aug. 22, 2012, 1:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2012/08/22/sec-approves-detaileddisclosure-on-conflict-minerals/.
63
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Along with transparency comes monitoring and perhaps enforcement.
Some states include benefit directors.67 A benefit director is intended to
monitor the benefit corporation’s pursuit and achievement of its nonpecuniary
purpose. States also authorize a “benefit enforcement proceeding”—
comparable to a shareholder derivative suit—to enable certain parties to legally
compel a benefit corporation’s directors to perform their fiduciary duties,
including their duty to advance the firm’s nonpecuniary purpose. Shareholders
and directors have standing to initiate a benefit enforcement proceeding, as do
other persons specified in the corporation’s organizational documents.68
Finally, perhaps most relevantly where controllers are content to neglect
the social mission, there is third-party certification. An independent standardsetting organization applying independently created standards is intended to
ensure that the benefit corporation is adequately pursuing its mission.69 The
annual benefit reports typically must report how well the corporation met these
standards.70 A concern here is that a benefit corporation may in fact be no
different than an ordinary corporation, but is attempting to benefit from the
halo of social enterprise. A for-profit social enterprise might pay only lip
service to the social mission—thereby deriving the potential branding and
signaling benefits of being perceived as a social enterprise without actually
contributing a significant social benefit. We thus have the situation of a wolf
(the conventional business) in sheep’s clothing (the social enterprise form).71
At the risk of being unduly pessimistic, we think that none of these
measures are particularly likely to prove successful. As a commentator has
concluded, the hybrid forms “lack[] robust mechanisms to enforce dual
mission.”72 Perhaps most glaringly, there is little to stop hybrid enterprises
from changing forms to a completely for-profit model. For example, a benefit
corporation that wishes to no longer be bound by the enacting statute may
convert into a regular corporation, typically with only a two-thirds majority
67

See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7.
See, e.g., id. § 14A:18-10.
69 See, e.g., id. § 14A:18-11(a)(2) (requiring an “assessment of the social and environmental performance
of the benefit corporation, prepared in accordance with a third-party standard”); see also id. § 14A:18-1
(defining “[t]hird-party standard”).
70 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630.
71 See Holmes, supra note 25 (noting that among the unanswered questions about hybrid business is
“how they will be monitored to ensure they are making a social impact”); see also Sustainability and the L3C,
CHI. CLEAN ENERGY ALLIANCE (June 23, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://www.theccea.org/2011/06/23/sustainablel3cs/ (noting the risk of greenwashing).
72 Brakman Reiser, supra note 48, at 593; see also Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the
Dual Mission Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105 (2010) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise].
68
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vote.73 This has been referred to as the “legacy problem,” when controllers
become unwilling or unable to continue supporting the mission.74 In this
scenario, the for-profit social enterprise has no statutory mission-maintenance
mechanism remotely as powerful as the nonprofits’ asset lock, also known as
the “nondistribution constraint.”75
Other forms intended for social enterprise use different or additional
approaches. To prevent either situation where controllers are not adequately
pursuing a social mission, the community interest company (CIC) in the
United Kingdom uses a public enforcement approach.76 The CIC Regulator is
empowered to ensure that the organization is in fact pursuing a “community
interest” and may even appoint or remove directors, sue in the CIC’s name,
prohibit the CIC’s transaction, or petition to terminate the CIC.77 (Likewise
nonprofits in the United States are in theory compelled to pursue their mission
through public enforcement by state attorneys general, although in practice
enforcement is weak.)78 Whether this is an effective measure or not will
depend in large part on the vigilance and resources of the regulator. In
addition, the CIC effectively has an asset lock.79 Investors’ returns are capped
at a specific rate of return and as a percentage of profits.80 So-called investors
in CICs actually resemble lenders, just as a U.S. nonprofit may have a lender.

73

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14601(d)(1)(B), 14610(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(d). As a
practical matter, there appears to be no evidence that two-thirds supermajority provisions have any significant
impact on widely held, publicly traded companies.
74 See Katz & Page, supra note 3, at 95–97.
75 Id. at 67.
76 See, e.g., Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27, §§ 42–51
(U.K.).
77 REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COS., STATUS, ROLE, FUNCTION AND LOCATION 8–9 (2010),
available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/cicregulator/docs/leaflets/10-1390-community-interest-companiesregulators-status-role-function-and-location-guide.pdf.
78 See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 939 (2004) (“[A]s a practical matter, few state attorneys general have the
funding and inclination to engage in aggressive charity enforcement.”); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love
Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’
Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 408 (2012) (“Although on occasion the state attorneys general
initiate action against nonprofits to address abuses, attorneys general simply do not have the resources to focus
on nonprofits as an effective monitor of directors’ duties.” (footnotes omitted)).
79 REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST COS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS FOR FUNDING
ORGANISATIONS 4, 7–11 (2009), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/cicregulator/docs/leaflets/09-1647community-interest-companies-frequently-asked-questions-for-funders-leaflet.pdf.
80 Id. at 9. A CIC is limited to paying out 35% of its profit and carrying forward any unused dividend
capacity to five years. Id.
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As compared to other organizational forms, the L3C gives interested parties
the most discretion to design a firm’s mechanism for sustaining its mission.
Although the L3C’s organizational documents must assert both that it would
not have been formed but for the accomplishment of its nonpecuniary purpose
and that no significant purpose of the L3C is “the production of income or the
appreciation of property,”81 enforcement is left undefined.82 Parties basically
set their own terms in the operating agreement, which is typically interpreted
and enforced like a contract.83 Sophisticated foundations may know enough in
advance that they will retain adequate control rights by contract. One method
might be to grant the foundation the right to be reimbursed for its investment at
any time (i.e., effectively a put option), the idea being that the threat of a
foundation withdrawing from the L3C should be enough to keep the operations
of the L3C in line.
In order to help determine whether these provisions are really helpful for
mission sustainability, it is useful to compare them to existing organizational
forms. To take the simplest first, L3Cs introduce nothing new. Anything that
can be done with an L3C can also be done with an LLC. Founders and
investors in an LLC that would like to pursue something other than profit
maximization can specify that, and any desired control arrangements (say veto
power for certain actions, or specific percentages for the allocation of
resources), in their operating agreement. Similarly, LLCs (and other
organizational forms) can all be eligible recipients of program-related
investment.
The CIC form, at least as compared to the U.S. context, also does not do
much for mission sustainability when compared to the nonprofit. Both have
potential enforcers, respectively the Community Interest Company Regulator84
and state attorneys general. Both have an asset lock. Both permit the payout of
resources, but where the CIC has a percentage cap on how much can be

81

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (West Supp. 2012).
Cf. John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C
Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 144–46 (2010) (noting that although the LLC is
“deeply rooted in strong freedom of contract principles, the ability to waive breaches of fiduciary duty is not
absolute”).
83 See, e.g., Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 290 n.20 (Del. 1999) (giving maximum
effect to the principle of freedom of contract); CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 14.02 (2012) (“[A]n LLC is at least as much a creature of
contract as of statute.”).
84 See The Regulator, COMMUNITY INT. COMPANIES, http://www.bis.gov.uk/cicregulator/about-us/
regulator (last visited May 11, 2013).
82
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returned to “investors,” nonprofits are capped at paying their lenders a
reasonable interest rate.85 In some situations perhaps it is an advantage to have
a specific percentage and thus an automatic bright-line safe harbor. In others,
however, such as if the percentage rate is set too low, the cap will serve to
deter lenders.86
Finally, examining corporations, existing corporate law is already good at
preventing shareholders from interfering with directors’ good-faith decisions,
so if directors want to pursue social aims, there is little legally shareholders can
do.87 Under the business judgment rule, directors have enormous latitude in
their decision making and their judgment is rarely overturned.88 Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co. and eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark are two cases where
arguably the pursuit of a social mission resulted in the directors’ decisions
being overturned, but there are few, if any, other examples, and in any case the
implications of Dodge for modern corporate law are particularly contested.89
The eBay case may even permit a company’s directors to pursue a
philanthropic purpose, as long as it is not the company’s exclusive purpose.90
(Moreover, states by statute expressly permit corporations to pursue a social
mission by way of donations to a separate nonprofit organization.)91 Many
states even have statutes that allow the consideration of other stakeholders,92
85

The riskier the nonprofit is as borrower, the more reasonable higher interest rates are.
In 2010, the U.K. Community Interest Corporation Regulator increased the interest rate cap on loan
interest. The Regulator had found that CICs thought the cap was too low, thereby discouraging investment. See
Sarah Townsend, New Rules to Aid Social Enterprise Investment, REGENERATION + RENEWAL (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.regen.net/Community_Renewal/article/976326/New-rules-aid-social-enterprise-investment/.
87 See, e.g., Antony Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 979, 988–89 (2009) (reviewing GREENFIELD, supra note 53). Conflict-of-interest situations, such as when
directors enrich themselves, are managed the same way in both benefit corporations and traditional
corporations. There are strong legal safeguards against self-enrichment and self-dealing, but there are few, if
any, effective safeguards against the shifting of profits (seen as subject to shareholders’ primary claim) to
deserving third parties.
88 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (noting that a “hallmark of
the business judgment rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the latter’s
decision can be attributed to any rational business purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89 See Page, supra note 87, at 987–88; M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 25 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No.
373, 2007) (arguing that the decision did not turn on the purpose of the corporation).
90 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010).
91 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2006) (providing that corporations may “[m]ake
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or
other national emergency in aid thereof”).
92 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West Supp. 2012). The Indiana statute specifically provides:
86

In taking or declining to take any action, or in making or declining to make any recommendation
to the shareholders of the corporation with respect to any matter, a board of directors may, in its

KATZ&PAGE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2013]

6/11/2013 9:22 AM

SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS

869

leaving directors protected just as they would be in a benefit corporation.93
When shareholders are unhappy with directors’ choices, their primary remedy
is to elect different directors,94 which is the same remedy that shareholders
have in a benefit corporation.
If founders want to preserve control, either as directors or as shareholders,
under existing corporate law there are several mechanisms by which this can
be done. Put differently, it is straightforward for parties to preserve control
rights that are independent of their economic interests. This would permit
social entrepreneurs to retain control of their businesses, just as entrepreneurs
can retain control of their businesses even after they accept other equity
investors. Facebook is a recent example, but Google and the New York Times
are two other prominent examples. All three use dual-class voting stock.95
Founders or their designees can retain a disproportionate amount of stock with
additional votes.96 Another approach is to issue preferred stock with veto rights
to selected parties, as Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. did with the Ben &
Jerry’s Foundation.97 Alternatively, different classes of stock can be given
different rights to elect directors.
All of the above measures depend upon at least one group, either the
directors or the controlling shareholders, staying committed to the mission.
Foundations can be formed that have such a legal obligation. It is much harder
discretion, consider both the short term and long term best interests of the corporation, taking into
account, and weighing as the directors deem appropriate, the effects thereof on the corporation’s
shareholders and the other corporate constituent groups and interests listed or described in
subsection (d), as well as any other factors deemed pertinent by the directors under subsection
(d). If a determination is made with respect to the foregoing with the approval of a majority of the
disinterested directors of the board of directors, that determination shall conclusively be
presumed to be valid unless it can be demonstrated that the determination was not made in good
faith after reasonable investigation.
Id. § 23-1-35-1(g). The factors included in subsection (d) are “shareholders, employees, suppliers, and
customers of the corporation, and communities in which offices or other facilities of the corporation are
located, and any other factors the director considers pertinent.” Id. § 23-1-35-1(d).
93 Until 2010, Connecticut had another constituency statute that required directors to consider other
stakeholders in the takeover context, but this was amended to make it permissive. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-756 (West Supp. 2012).
94 See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“Generally,
shareholders have only two protections against perceived inadequate business performance. They may sell
their stock . . . or they may vote to replace incumbent board members.”).
95 Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012); Google Inc., Registration Statement
(Form S-1) (Apr. 29, 2004).
96 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 20–21, 127 (Feb. 1, 2012); N.Y. Times
Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 7–9 (Mar. 9, 2012).
97 See Page & Katz, supra note 37, at 238.
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to do this with natural persons, given that preferences change and people move
on and pass away. eBay v. Newmark is illustrative, as it was essentially about
mission maintenance over time. The defendants controlled the company,
Craigslist, Inc., and wanted to preserve its communitarian culture and prevent
it from being overwhelmed by eBay’s culture at some point in the future.98 The
rights plan was designed to make it much harder for eBay to increase its stake
in Craigslist, and possibly gain control, in the event that the two defendants, or
their estates, later wanted to sell.99 There was no possible threat from eBay to
Craigslist for as long as the two defendants chose to retain their controlling
shares. The judge had it exactly right when he said the defendants were
attempting to “shape the future of the space–time continuum” by preventing
changes.100
The above, however, is the same challenge faced by benefit corporations. If
both the directors and controlling shareholders lose interest in the mission, the
mission is unlikely to be sustained, thus there too the benefit corporation offers
little advantage. Note also that the eBay case did nothing to change Craigslist’s
day-to-day operations. The directors were able to continue operating the
company with full regard for its communitarian, noncommercial (and almost
certainly not exclusively profit maximizing) culture.101
We are left with soft arguments rather than hard arguments, or norms not
laws. Perhaps providing a standard form helps make a particular provision the
default. Or perhaps it serves to signal that the provision is presumptively
reasonable. At the very least, a standard form is likely to reduce transaction
costs.
It is also possible that any of these forms may promote mission
sustainability not through legal provisions, but by changing organizational
culture and thereby changing people’s views and preferences. Organizational
culture may, in addition to legal mechanisms, be a key way to increase the
likelihood of mission sustainability.

98 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 7 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting that eBay and
Craigslist “are a study in contrasts, with different business strategies, different cultures, and different
perspectives on what it means to run a successful business”).
99 Id. at 32.
100 Id.
101 Craig Newmark and James Buckmaster, the two defendants in the eBay case, retained control of
Craigslist. The only actions eBay challenged were the defensive measures: the rights plan, a staggered board,
and right of first refusal over eBay’s shares in Craigslist. Id. at 6–7.
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Consider the New York Times. It is a publicly traded company committed to
producing a newspaper of record, even at a cost in profits. The company has a
dual-class stock that puts control in a family trust.102 The company’s SEC
filings disclose that the trust’s “primary objective . . . is to maintain the
editorial independence and the integrity of The New York Times and to
continue it as an independent newspaper, entirely fearless, free of ulterior
influence and unselfishly devoted to the public welfare.”103 Even as the stock
has dropped 80% over the last eight years and investors have protested, the
Times has refused to give up its social mission. One commentator observed
that “the tension between the Times’[s] public trust and the Times’[s] business
is sharper than it’s ever been,” and opined that it seems unlikely that the Times
can still “be both virtuous and rich.”104
Even as the family’s fifth generation takes over the trust, the commitment
to the public remains. Family members start attending meetings at the age of
ten, go on private retreats, have orientation sessions, and meet with top
editors.105 Apparently “by [fifteen] they understand their roles as caretakers of
the New York Times.”106
Compare this to the Wall Street Journal, which had a similar corporate
structure, in that it was controlled by dual classes of stock owned through
trusts,107 and a similar journalistic mission. Even so, members of the
controlling family, the Bancrofts, ceased to be seriously involved with the
paper by the 1930s.108 When they received a generous offer in 2007, they voted
to sell to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, even though it was
controversial.109
All of the above helps illustrate the limitations of law. There already is a
legal form, the nonprofit organization, that entails an obligation to organize
102 N.Y. Times Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 7 (Mar. 9, 2012) (noting that the trust, which holds
83.7% of the New York Times Class B stock, has “the right to elect approximately 70% of the Board of
Directors”)
103 Id.
104 Joe Hagan, Bleeding ‘Times’ Blood, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 5, 2008), www.nymag.com/news/media/51015/.
105 Id.
106 Id. (“From an early age, Sulzberger children are taught to value their role as stewards of the paper and
servants to the public good.”).
107 Dow Jones & Co., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Nov. 7, 2007).
108 See Richard Pérez-Peña, Shareholders Back Dow Jones Sale, N.Y. TIMES. (Dec. 13, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/13/business/media/13cnd-dow.html?_r=2&ref=media&oref=slogin&.
109 See generally SARAH ELLISON, WAR AT THE WALL STREET JOURNAL: INSIDE THE STRUGGLE TO
CONTROL AN AMERICAN BUSINESS EMPIRE, at xvi, xxi (2010).
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and operate exclusively for a larger purpose—something other than enriching
insiders—and a prohibition against diverting assets away from that purpose.110
Moreover, a nonprofit’s mission tends to be very difficult to legally change. As
the mission becomes more flexible and as assets can begin to be diverted to
other objectives, the importance of the decision makers becomes more critical.
After all, more discretion means more opportunity to make more unreviewable
decisions. If the business is housed in any for-profit organizational form,
controllers will have the ability to shortchange or sell out the social mission.
The new forms—benefit corporations, CICs in the United Kingdom, L3Cs, and
Certified B Corps—do not fundamentally change this. The only way to be sure
a social enterprise’s mission is protected and vigorously pursued is to have
committed people in place, and a plan to ensure that when they leave, more
committed people come in. If an organization has an adequate structure,
corporate or otherwise, it will be the decision makers who make the
difference.111
Notwithstanding the foregoing, benefit corporations may in fact promote
sustainability, albeit not for the reason most promoters advocate. It is not that
these organizational forms necessarily make missions significantly more
sustainable—they do not—but they do provide a better model of what a
sustainable corporation might look like. Even without effective enforcement,
statutes mandate the directors of benefit corporations in their decision making
to consider such matters as “community and societal factors” and “the local,
regional and global environment.”112 Moreover, regardless of whether
corporate law permits corporations to pursue social missions—it does—it
surely does not encourage it.113 The mere provision of an alternate model may
be sufficient to encourage creation of an alternative economy of people
committed to sustainable development. The creation of benefit corporations
may offer a glimpse of one account of a sustainable corporation, as one that
operates and reports using a triple bottom line.

110

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth About Ben & Jerry’s, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.,
Fall 2012, at 39, 43 (“The surest way to maintain a business’[s] social mission is to put committed people in
charge.”).
112 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 10(a) (West Supp. 2012).
113 See, e.g., Todd Henderson, Al Franken, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, and the Business Judgment
Rule, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 27, 2010, 4:07 PM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
professorbainbridgecom/2010/07/shareholder-wealth-maximization-and-the-business-judgment-rule.html
(stating that “corporate law does not intend to promote corporate social responsibility, but rather merely allows
it to exist”).
111
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III. SUSTAINABILITY IS THE MISSION
A social enterprise pursues profits and one or more nonpecuniary purposes
and assesses its performance using a “double bottom line,” a term that
“describe[s] a social enterprise’s balance of financial viability and social
impact.”114 The universe of nonpecuniary purposes that social enterprises may
pursue is vast. For example, an enterprise organized as an L3C may be deemed
“social,” it would seem, insofar as its business purpose “significantly furthers
the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes” as
defined by the charitable contribution provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.115 (California’s flexible purpose corporation also relies on the federal tax
code’s charitable tax provisions to define the nonpecuniary purposes suitable
for the form.)116 The tax code’s definition includes many purposes not
generally associated with “social enterprise,” including religious purposes,
literary purposes, and “foster[ing] national or international amateur sports
competition.”117 Indeed, the tax code’s definition of charitable purposes is so
broad that, as the U.S. Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation has observed,
it “encompass[es] several ideas that would not generally be considered as
charitable in the ordinary sense” of relieving the poor and distressed.118 A 2005
survey of tax-exempt organizations showed, in the Committee’s words, that
“there is no overriding principle explaining tax exempt status.”119
The sustainable business concept is far more determinate than social
enterprise. A sustainable business expounds its purposes using the tripartite (3P) model of “People, Profit, Planet,”120 which corresponds to (1) “[e]nsuring a
fair society”; (2) “[l]iving within environmental limits”; and (3) “[c]reating a
sustainable business.”121 It assesses its performance using a triple bottom line

114 Anthony Bisconti, Note, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect Socially
Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 767 n.6 (2009) (citing Jerr
Boschee, Editorial, Doing Good While Doing Well, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 19, 2008, at G1).
115 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2012). The provision identifies “charitable or
educational purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26
U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B).” Id. This set of purposes significantly overlaps with those set forth in I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3), which defines the purposes of nonprofit organizations exempt from paying federal taxes on
corporate income.
116 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2) (West 2013).
117 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
118 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-29-05, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW
OF THE FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 8 (2005).
119 Id. at 159.
120 See, e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 48, at 624.
121 FISK, supra note 4, at 8 fig.0.3.
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of economic, social, and environmental outcomes. These ideas, wrote Dana
Brakman Reiser, “clearly resonate with the fundamental ideas of a social
enterprise, melding pursuit of profits with social good, often including
environmental goals.”122 In a sustainable business, however, environmental
goals are not optional; rather, they are at its core. The most ambitious
sustainable businesses embrace the larger sustainable development agenda,
which seeks environmental sustainability and global social justice and asserts
an inherent connection between the two. This connection is problematic,
however, giving rise to an inherent tension between a sustainable business’s
pursuit of environmental goals and its concurrent pursuit of social ones.
A. Sustainability and Sustainable Development
The triple bottom line can trace its lineage to the concepts of sustainability
and sustainable development. Modern usage of sustainability is credited to
Hans Carl von Carlowitz (1645–1714), a German mining administrator.123
Carlowitz advocated the “nachhaltende Nutzung (sustainable use)” of forest
resources that supported the silver mining industry.124 Carlowitz’s approach
implied maintaining a balance between harvesting old trees and ensuring that
there were enough young trees to replace them.125 (Left unsaid is whether and
what Carlowitz thought about the sustainability of an industry based on mining
a nonrenewable resource.) Other forestry experts from Carlowitz’s era
“condemned excessive wood consumption as a practice that would bring
negative consequences for future generations.”126 From this background was
“nachhaltigkeit”—German for “sustainability”127—derived.

122

Brakman Reiser, supra note 48, at 624 (emphasis added).
See Ian Scoones, Sustainability, 17 DEV. PRAC. 589, 590 (2007) (“But like all buzzwords, the term
sustainability has a history. It has not always had such significant connotations. The term was first coined
several hundred years ago by a German forester, Hans Carl von Carlowitz, in his 1712 text Sylvicultura
Oeconomica, to prescribe how forests should be managed on a long-term basis.”). See generally Ulrich Grober,
The Inventor of Sustainability, ZEIT ONLINE (Sept. 11, 2009, 4:35 PM), http://www.zeit.de/1999/48/Der_
Erfinder_der_Nachhaltigkeit.
124 Jacobus A. Du Pisani, Sustainable Development—Historical Roots of the Concept, 3 ENVTL. SCI. 83,
85–86 (2006).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 86; see also, e.g., Ulrich Grober, Deep Roots—A Conceptual History of ‘Sustainable
Development’ (Nachhaltigkeit) 21 (Feb. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
umweltethik.at/download.php?id=373 (“Georg Ludwig Hartig [(1764–1837)], head of the Prussian forest
department, called for a mode of harvesting timber that should yield as much as possible in a way that
posterity would have at least as much benefit from it as the presently living generation.”).
127 Grober, supra note 126; see COLLINS GERMAN/ENGLISH ENGLISH/GERMAN DICTIONARY 576 (Peter
Terrell et al. eds., 4th ed. 1999).
123
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Contemporary usage of sustainable in connection with environmental
concerns first appeared in publications such as The Limits to Growth, an
influential 1972 report published by the Club of Rome, a group of prominent
economists and scientists.128 That report’s authors warned that ‘‘[i]f the present
growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food
production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on
this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years.”129
The consequences of exceeding these limits would likely be catastrophic, i.e.,
“a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial
capacity.”130 As a prelude to averting this fate, the authors sought to model “a
world system that is: 1. sustainable without sudden and uncontrolled collapse;
and 2. capable of satisfying the basic material requirements of all of its
people.”131 Environmental sustainability required less economic
development—slower growth, if not zero growth.
The compound term sustainable development entered global discourse
following publication of the 1987 report, Our Common Future, written by the
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), an entity
commissioned by the United Nations. Our Common Future famously defined
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs.”132 Sustainability expert Pim Martens put the matter more starkly: “The
essence of sustainable development is simply this: to provide for the
fundamental needs of humankind without doing violence to the natural system
of life on earth.”133
The WCED was chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, then-Prime Minister
of Norway and formerly its Minister for Environmental Affairs.134 In her
128

See Grober, supra note 126, at 6; see also Du Pisani, supra note 124, at 90 (describing the Club of
Rome as “a group of eminent economists and scientists”).
129 DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH: A REPORT OF THE CLUB OF ROME’S PROJECT
ON THE PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND 23 (1972).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
132 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987); see also Subhabrata Bobby
Banerjee, Who Sustains Whose Development? Sustainable Development and the Reinvention of Nature, 24
ORG. STUD. 143, 151–52 (2003).
133 Pim Martens, Sustainability: Science or Fiction?, SUSTAINABILITY: SCI. PRAC. & POL’Y 36 (2006),
http://sspp.proquest.com/static_content/vol2iss1/communityessay.martens.pdf.
134 Erik A. Wold, New Labor Government Installed in Norway, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 9, 1986,
available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/New-Labor-Government-Installed-in-Norway/id-765f1b9b3
f767d921d8fc524a73f37a1. Ulrich Grober traces the “sustainable development” formulation to a 1980 report
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foreword to Our Common Future, Brundtland recounted that when the
Commission’s mandate was being discussed, “there were those who wanted its
considerations to be limited to ‘environmental issues’ only.”135 There was also
resistance to the inclusion of “development” concerns, which sometimes refer
to poor nations’ efforts to improve their condition, as outside the
Commission’s purview. The WCED took development to refer more broadly to
self-betterment through economic activity. It insisted that these be studied in
tandem: “[T]he ‘environment’ is where we all live,” wrote Brundtland, “and
‘development’ is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that
abode.”136
B. Corporate Sustainability and the Triple Bottom Line
Following publication of Our Common Future, interest in the concept of
sustainability surged among management scholars, as reflected by the number
of articles in leading management journals on the topics of corporate
sustainability, ecological sustainability,137 and corporate sustainable
development.138 The concept of corporate sustainability resulted from efforts
by management scholars to operationalize Our Common Future’s conception
of interconnectedness at the firm level.139 In this vein, some management
scholars view corporate sustainability “as a tridimensional construct that
includes environmental, economic, and social dimensions” of corporate

entitled World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development. Grober,
supra note 126, at 5 (“In 1980, the ‘International Union for the Conservation of Nature,’ an association of
nation states, environmental agencies and NGOs together with UNEP, the environmental programme of the
United Nations, and the World Wildlife Fund, a non-governmental organization, published their ‘World
Conservation Strategy.’ Under the patronage of the UN-General Secretary, this declaration was simultaneously
presented in 34 capital cities around the world.”). He also claims that the term sustainable development
“entered the global stage during the 1992 ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro. The United Nations presented it as
their strategic concept for shaping—and indeed saving—the future of the ‘blue planet.’ It promised to become
the key-word for describing a new balance between the use and the preservation of nature’s potentials and
resources.” Id.
135 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., supra note 132.
136 Id.
137 Ivan Montiel, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Sustainability: Separate Pasts, Common
Futures, 21 ORG. & ENV’T 245, 256 tbl.4 (2008).
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Thomas Dyllick & Kai Hockerts, Beyond the Business Case for Corporate Sustainability, 11
BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 130, 131 (2002) (“When transposing this idea [of sustainable development] to the
business level, corporate sustainability can accordingly be defined as meeting the needs of a firm’s
direct and indirect stakeholders (such as shareholders, employees, clients, pressure groups,
communities etc.), without compromising its ability to meet the needs of future stakeholders as
well.”).
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activity.140 On this view, a sustainable firm must effectively balance the
creation of economic value with concern for social and environmental
issues.141
The concept of corporate sustainability was introduced to a wider audience
by prominent author and consultant John Elkington in his 1997 book
Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business.142
Elkington familiarly identified the key dimensions of corporate sustainability
as economic, social, and environmental.143 In Elkington’s view, these “three
pillars” (as he calls them) correspond to three core aspirations of a sustainable
capitalist system—“economic prosperity, environmental quality, and social
justice.”144 Each at its level adumbrates the same idea: “people, planet,
profit.”145 The triple bottom line, wrote Elkington, “captures an expanded
spectrum of values and criteria for measuring organizational (and societal)
success.”146 The triple-bottom-line framework has been embraced by a wide
audience. In explaining its popularity, Carol Adams, Geoff Frost, and Wendy
Webber observed that it “provided a language that made sense of the
sustainability concept to a population focused on the economic bottom line.”147
Our Common Future identified poverty as a source of environmental
degradation, asserting that “poverty itself pollutes the environment, creating
environmental stress in a different way. Those who are poor and hungry will
often destroy their immediate environment in order to survive . . . .”148 This
view, argued Professor of Politics Andrew Dobson, “le[d] the Commission to
recommend considerable global and national redistributions of wealth, in the
belief that such redistributions [are] functional for environmental
140 Montiel, supra note 137, at 254; see also id. at 259 (“[Corporate sustainability] scholars tend to argue
that the economic, social, and environmental pillars are interconnected.”). A smaller number of corporate
sustainability scholars focus mainly on how a firm interacts with the natural environment. Id.; Sanjay Sharma,
Research in Corporate Sustainability: What Really Matters?, in RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY:
THE EVOLVING THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 1, 1 (Sanjay
Sharma & Mark Starik eds., 2002) (discussing the research agenda of the “organizations and the natural
environment” (ONE) section of the management academy).
141 E-mail from Ivan Montiel to author (Aug 28, 2012, 22:12) (on file with authors).
142 ELKINGTON, supra note 5. For another popularization of corporate sustainability, see SAVITZ, supra
note 5.
143 ELKINGTON, supra note 5, at 72–73.
144 Id. at vii, 70.
145 See JOHN ELKINGTON, THE ZERONAUTS: BREAKING THE SUSTAINABILITY BARRIER 250 (2012).
146 Id.
147 Carol Adams et al., Triple Bottom Line: A Review of the Literature, in THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE:
DOES IT ALL ADD UP? 17, 18 (Adrian Henriques & Julie Richardson eds., 2004).
148 WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., supra note 132.
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sustainability.”149 That is, “they encourage sustainable behaviour.”150 The
argument is “that greater equality will lead to a more securely sustainable
environment.”151 It is distinct from the claim that justice requires fewer wealth
disparities between rich and poor countries, or more fairness between the
present and future generations. One can readily understand how a person’s
views on social or economic justice might bias her assessment of the causal
relationship between equality and environmental sustainability. “It is, indeed,”
wrote Dobson, “something of an article of faith in the sustainable development
movement that a precondition for global sustainability is a global redistribution
of wealth . . . .”152
If this is true, then empirical uncertainty can drive a wedge between the
principles of sustainability and global social justice or cosmopolitan morality.
Cosmopolitanism is the normative ideal that all human beings have an equal
moral worth that gives rise to moral duties owed to all human beings.153 Moral
cosmopolitans and sustainability advocates are each deeply committed to
reducing poverty-related suffering in the underdeveloped world. Andrew
Kuper, a leading cosmopolitan thinker, wrote that “[n]othing is more
politically important to think about, and act upon, than global poverty
relief.”154 There is a critical difference, however, in how they justify their
concern. If you ask a sustainability advocate why she wants to reduce poverty
overseas, she must give a provisional answer that depends on whether feeding
people now really reduces environmental degradation. This suggests a gap
between the science and morals of sustainability, or that proponents of
sustainable development are not fully cognizant or candid about the
foundations of their call for greater global equity.

149 ANDREW DOBSON, JUSTICE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONCEPTIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY AND DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 14 (1998).
150 Andrew Dobson, Introduction, in FAIRNESS AND FUTURITY: ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 3 (Andrew Dobson ed., 1999).
151 DOBSON, supra note 149, at 14.
152 Dobson, supra note 150, at 3 (emphasis added).
153 Roland Pierik & Wouter Werner, Cosmopolitanism in Context: An Introduction, in COSMOPOLITANISM
IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 1, 3 (Roland Pierik &
Wouter Werner eds., 2010).
154 Andrew Kuper, More than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the ‘Singer Solution,’ 16 ETHICS &
INT’L AFF. 107, 107 (2002).
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C. Sustainable Business and the New Legal Structures
Of the new forms enacted, the privately supplied Certified B Corp and the
state-enacted benefit corporation come closest to providing a legal prototype
and framework for sustainable or triple-bottom-line business. The Certified B
Corp is the creation of B Lab, a Pennsylvania-based 501(c)(3) nonprofit
founded in 2007. B Lab seeks to aid social entrepreneurs by developing and
promoting a more robust legal infrastructure for their activities, including new
legal arrangements for sustainable businesses.155 To this end, B Lab will confer
the trademarked designation of “Certified B Corporation” on entities that meet
its “standards of social and environmental performance, accountability, and
transparency.”156
B Lab is also a partner in the American Sustainable Business Council,
which expressly supports sustainable development.157 B Lab’s activities are in
alignment with a global sustainability agenda, as reflected in their public
statements. If their project succeeds, their web page asserts, “individuals and
communities will enjoy greater economic opportunity, society will address its
most challenging environmental problems, and more people will find
fulfillment by bringing their whole selves to work.”158 It encourages “all
companies to compete not just to be the best in the world, but to be the best for
the world.”159 Certified B Corps must endorse a “Declaration of
Interdependence,” which states, among other “self-evident” truths, that
businesses “should aspire to do no harm and benefit all” and “act with the
understanding that we are each dependent upon another and thus responsible
for each other and future generations.”160

155

See The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-bcorps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited May 11, 2013) (“B Corp certification is to sustainable
business what LEED certification is to green building or Fair Trade certification is to coffee.”).
156 Id.
157 B Lab, AM. SUSTAINABLE BUS. COUNCIL, http://asbcouncil.org/partner/b-lab (last visited May 11,
2013). For an over-the-top, critical screed on B Lab’s links to sustainable development, see Stephen Poole,
Benefit Corporations: Expansion of the Public–Private Fascist State, Part 2, FREEDOM ADVOCATES (Aug. 15,
2011, 3:31 PM), http://www.freedomadvocates.org/articles/illegitimate_government/benefit_corporations%
3a_expansion_of_the_public-private_fascist_state%2c_part_2__20110815447/.
158 Why B Corps Matter, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/why-b-corpsmatter (last visited May 11, 2013).
159 Id. (emphasis omitted).
160 The B Corp Declaration, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-bcorp-declaration (last visited May 11, 2013).
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B Lab also prods state legislatures to enact benefit corporation
legislation.161 The various benefit corporation statutes enacted by state
legislatures typically mandate a “purpose of creating general public benefit”162
where a general public benefit is defined along the lines of “[a] material
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed
against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit
corporation.”163 Note that the impact is phrased in the conjunctive: a positive
impact on society and the environment. Subject, of course, to the actual impact
of the third-party standard, this would appear to legislate that a benefit
corporation must be a triple-bottom-line organization.164 Moreover, a benefit
corporation’s directors must, in performing their duties, consider both a variety
of social concerns and the local and global environment,165 even if most legal
efforts to enforce these duties are unlikely to succeed.
This approach represents a clear advance over even the most progressive
approaches of yesteryear. There is no better example of the unsustainable
mindset than the one articulated in the founding text of modern corporate
social responsibility and a precursor to the double bottom line, Howard
Bowen’s 1953 book Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. Bowen
posited that “businessmen” (by which he meant the controllers of large public
corporations) have a responsibility to conduct business “with concern for the
effects of business operations upon the attainment of valued social goals.”166
The first valued social goal Bowen identified is to pursue a “‘high standard of
living’” for Americans, as reflected in “an abundance of goods and services
available for consumption by the masses of the people.”167 The second goal is

161 See Legislation, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation (last
visited May 11, 2013).
162 Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, supra note 60, at 11.
163 Id. at 3; see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(c) (West 2013) (similar).
164 Several states, perhaps intending to give more form to the foundational “material positive impact on
society and the environment,” require that it result from the “operations of a benefit corporation through
activities that promote some combination of specific public benefits.” See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1
(West Supp. 2012); see also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(c) (West Supp. 2012) (requiring
that the material positive impact be created “through activities that promote a combination of specific public
benefits”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03(a)(4) (West Supp. 2012) (similar). If a New Jersey benefit
corporation were to choose specific public benefits without any positive environmental impact, it becomes
difficult to see how it would achieve a material positive impact on the environment.
165 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 10(a) (West Supp. 2012).
166 HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 8 (1953).
167 Id.
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“[e]conomic [p]rogress,” by which he means “the steady advancement of that
standard” of living—ever-increasing production and consumption.168
Contrast this worldview with the account set forth in a report drafted for the
UN in advance of the 2012 Rio+20 Conference.169 In a sustainable world
economy, wrote the authors, “ever-increasing consumption is no longer
considered an integral component of human needs.”170 Rather, “[p]eople pay
attention to their other needs and desires, such as joy, beauty, affection,
participation, creativity, freedom, and understanding.”171 This worldview
recalls The Limits to Growth and its call for a world system that is both
sustainable and satisfying.
CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL LOSSES FROM ADDING A THIRD BOTTOM LINE
There are critical differences between the concept of a social enterprise
(with dual missions and double-bottom-line metrics) and the concept of a
sustainable business (with tripartite missions and triple-bottom-line metrics).
For-profit businesses can aspire to be environmentally sustainable and even
define themselves in part by their commitment to environmental sustainability.
The deeper that commitment, the less accurate it is to describe entities so
committed as simply social enterprises with an environmental bent.
Both the double- and triple-bottom-line frameworks spotlight a firm’s
nonpecuniary goals and performance. Yet by singling out the environment for
separate and additional consideration, the triple bottom line implies that a
firm’s environmental performance is essential to assessing the firm’s
success.172 This implication may obscure the potential conflict among a firm’s
nonpecuniary commitments.
Consider a social entrepreneur who wants to improve the lives of people
residing in Whiterock, a low-income inner-city neighborhood. She starts the
Bakery, a for-profit company that sells jumbo-sized cupcakes, in order to
168

Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted).
ROBERT COSTANZA ET AL., BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE AND DESIRABLE ECONOMY-IN-SOCIETY-INNATURE (2012).
170 Id. at 19.
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Daniela Ebner & Rupert J. Baumgartner, The Relationship Between Sustainable
Development and Corporate Social Responsibility 5 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.crrconference.org/downloads/2006ebnerbaumgartner.pdf (noting that WCED’s account of
sustainable development and triple bottom line “believes in an equal consideration of ecological, social and
economic aspects to meet present and future needs” (emphasis added)).
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create jobs for undertrained and otherwise hard-to-employ residents. She
organizes the company as an L3C in Vermont (or as a flexible purpose
corporation in California), and identifies “the relief of poor and distressed
Americans” as its nonpecuniary purpose. The Bakery is so profitable that it can
offer above-market wages and job training while generating solid financial
returns for owners and investors.173 In order to achieve these results, however,
the Bakery must keep other production costs low. To this end, it imports
kitchen equipment made from child labor, buys milk from dairies that keep
their cows in cramped, dirty stalls, and uses materials from nonsustainable
sources.174 Its products also tend to make its consumers fatter. (Whiterock’s
mayor is agitating the Bakery to make smaller cupcakes.)
The Bakery is a robust social enterprise. It is financially sustainable: the
more cupcakes it sells, the more jobs and training it can offer to Whiterock
residents. The company’s legal structure may make its nonpecuniary mission
more sustainable at the margin, if only indirectly. At the same time, the Bakery
does not aspire to become a 3-P/triple-bottom-line-style sustainable business.
In setting its nonpecuniary priorities, the Bakery’s controllers have chosen to
benefit downtrodden people in the United States over those overseas, humans
over other animals, and the present generation over the future. This plan has
been well received by the Bakery’s most immediate nonshareholding
stakeholders—its employees, the community in which it operates (with the
possible exception of the mayor), and cupcake lovers everywhere.
The triple-bottom-line approach, by singling out environmental goals from
the broader portfolio of nonpecuniary goals, has other consequences.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some proponents of a triple bottom line are
relatively diffident about the social dimension. In their review of management
literature on sustainable development, Ebner and Baumgartner reported that
“[t]he social dimension of [sustainable development] is still the weakest pillar
and has been neglected in discussions over the years in comparison to the other
two aspects” among articles that define social development in terms of the Our
Common Future report and the triple bottom line.175 In Cannibals with Forks,

173 This example is loosely modeled on Greyston Bakery. See GREYSTON BAKERY, http://www.
greystonbakery.com/ (last visited May 11, 2013). There are some key differences. Greyston Bakery is in fact a
Certified B Corp that is attempting to increase its reliance on solar energy. See Hello, Sunshine!, GREYSTON
BAKERY, http://www.greystonbakery.com/the-bakery/hello-sunshine/ (last visited May 11, 2013).
174 Cf. William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining the
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 842 (2012).
175 Ebner & Baumgartner, supra note 172, at 6.
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Elkington offered a single half-hearted and light-hearted illustration of the
social bottom line in action: he suggested that if French actress Brigitte Bardot
were a corporation, she would fail, “[d]espite her economic and environmental
contributions” to France, because of her xenophobic “views on immigration”
and her “support for the extreme right-wing National Front party.”176 The
deficient “social justice dimension” of her performance would “prevent[] her
[from] achieving a win-win-win outcome.”177
The Bardot, Inc. hypothetical underscores the sometimes controversial
nature of assessing good or poor social performance. Consider Chick-Fil-A,
the fast food chain whose president expressed support for “the biblical
definition of the family unit” and opposition to homosexual unions.178 Some
people praised the chain’s president for looking beyond its financial bottom
line in order to promote the owning family’s understanding of the social
good.179 Those who would distinguish the company from its president (ChickFil-A affirms that it treats “every person with honor, dignity and respect—
regardless of their belief, race, creed, sexual orientation or gender”)180 must
still address the company’s policies. The chain is well-known for closing on
Sundays, unlike almost every other fast food chain.181 Who would deny that
the promotion of Christian values is a social contribution? Such controversies
arise whenever a for-profit business moves beyond the single bottom line.
Social enterprise and sustainable business each attempt to solve a different
problem, and these problems differ vastly in scale. Social enterprise and the
new organizational forms address a relatively discrete and concrete problem:
how can mission-driven organizations expand access to capital without
endangering their missions, enabling them to combine the most advantageous
176

ELKINGTON, supra note 5, at XI.
Id.
178 Jack Nicas, First Amendment Trumps Critics of Chick-fil-A’s Views, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2012, at A2
(internal quotation marks omitted).
179 Stephen Bainbridge quoted with approval a blogger’s post:
177

Doesn’t the demand that corporations act responsibly in the interests of society, in ways other
than profit-seeking, directly imply that corporate leaders who find same-sex marriage socially
irresponsible should do something or other to discourage it?
Matters of moral truth aside, what’s the difference between buying a little social justice with
your coffee and buying a little Christian traditionalism with your chicken? There is no difference.
Stephen Bainbridge, CSR Bleeding Hearts Hoist by Own Petard by Chick-Fil-A, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Aug. 17, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2012/08/csrbleeding-hearst-hoist-by-own-petard-by-chick-fil-a.html.
180 Nicas, supra note 178.
181 Id.
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features of the for-profit and nonprofit forms. The ability of the new forms to
achieve these aims has been extensively discussed, but relatively little has been
said about the substantive goals these forms pursue, other than that these be
legally charitable, confer public benefit, and so on.
In contrast, the sustainable business movement is attempting to enlist
private enterprise in a global struggle to avert humanitarian disaster and
ecological catastrophe. Although it has been little remarked upon, the benefit
corporation approach provides a model for how such private enterprises may
be organized. In a sense, such forms may serve as a Trojan horse,
incorporating the triple bottom line into all social enterprise and erasing the
distinction between social enterprise and sustainable business. No longer may a
social entrepreneur simply follow her bliss if that bliss is deemed
environmentally unsustainable. It may be true, as some claim, that addressing
some social needs today will reduce environmental degradation tomorrow, but
undoubtedly this is not necessarily or not always the case. The problems
produced by imposing a second nonpecuniary bottom line on dual-mission
enterprises remain unsolved.

